Tag Archives: Anwar Shaikh

Inflation – what to do depends on your starting point

I have a T-shirt that I am wearing as I type this. On its front, in mock Gothic text are the words:

The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of commodities,” its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity.

These are the opening words of Marx’s epic work, Capital. As openings go, it is not as memorable as “In the beginning God created the heavens and earth” (Genesis), or “Man is born free, but everywhere is in chains” (Rousseau), or even Marx’s own “There is a spectre haunting Europe”.

However, it was only after reading Anwar Shaikh’s Capitalism and listening to his lectures that I realised the importance of this opening to Capital.

T-shirt with the opening words of Marx's Des Capital.

Comparing starting points

Marx’s words here are a recognition that to analyse capitalism we must start with the production of commodities, and their expression/capture of value. In capitalism, production does not happen as a charitable act or even as a provisioning of society in response to demand for goods and services (because we know that many people are not provisioned and some demand for necessities is unmet). Rather, production is organised and happens in the expectation of profit. From this starting point comes an analysis of:

  • how the production process is structured and contested,
  • the extraction of value beyond the cost of inputs into that production process, and
  • how this surplus is shared through the community – initially the distribution between capital and labour, but subsequently through flows to different parts of capital (e.g. financiers, technology owners) and finally through tax and transfers to different parts of the economy and society.

By contrast, much mainstream economics tends to start from exchange in a market – the price at the meeting of supply and demand. The production process is almost assumed (at least in the first instance). The return to capital is naturalised at an equilibrium rate determined by the market, while at the macrolevel, equilibrium can be obtained (or at least approached) by management of supply and demand – because what governs the economy is not a pursuit of profit but a market whose “natural state” is equilibrium.[1]

At one level, the different starting points mean that we are simply asking different questions and one may choose a theory depending on what question you want answered. However, it is more complicated than that, partly because the above is over-simplified, but also because, as I argued long ago, such theoretical starting points do not just ask different questions, they actually create different objects of inquiry – “the economy” is a different animal in the different theories.

But beyond that, the different starting points may have very different policy outcomes. Take for instance our current problem of persistent inflation.

Inflation

Regardless of the external factors that may have kicked off inflation (e.g. COVID, war, energy shocks), if your economic starting point is a supply and demand equilibrium, you are likely to see the need to reduce demand in the economy to ensure that demand is not exceeding supply and thus pushing up prices. At the most basic level, reducing demand at the macroeconomic demand can be done by:

  • fiscal policy, that is, increasing taxes to take money out of households and business, thus reducing their demand for goods and services), or
  • monetary policy – that is, increasing interest rates which in theory will increase savings (or loan repayments), similarly meaning there is less money to demand goods and services.

Fiscal policy is regarded as dangerous, partly because neoliberalism has convinced us that taxation is bad (and even undemocratic) and partly because surpluses lead to political pressures to cut taxes or spend more – which would be inflationary. So, we are left with the Reserve Bank increasing interest rates to try to dampen demand and bring inflation back to its target zone (2-3% p.a.)

However, if you start your economic analysis not from a theory of equilibrium supply and demand, but rather from a theory of capitalism and flows of value in an economy, then firstly, you might question the possibility of macroeconomic control by demand-management – as Shaikh does. Secondly, you might want to trace the impact of interest rates on flows in the real economy, where higher interest rates represent a bigger claim on surplus by finance capital. In this analysis, those seeking to make money out of non-finance capital are forced, to the extent possible, to increase their prices to maintain their return on capital.

This is most evident in the housing market where rental prices are increasing faster than inflation (September Quarter 2023 CPI: 5.4%, rent increases 7.6%). Higher interest rates increases costs and lowers the return to landlords with mortgages. They then put up rents to cover their increased costs, while landlords without mortgages can cash in on the higher rents attainable in the market. In this scenario, interest rates are driving rental inflation. Further, as the ABS has highlighted, rent increases are one of the major contributors to overall inflation. This is not to deny that there are supply problems in the rental market, but it does suggest that increasing interest rates may have a contradictory inflationary impacts.

Similarly, the conventional wisdom of higher interest rates taking money and demand out of the economy is challenged by the fact that around one-third of Australian households are not paying a mortgages or rent. For many of those households, higher interest rates translates as increased income from their savings. They have more money to spend and there is a growing recognition that this is promoting demand in those groups and undermining the demand-reducing purpose of increasing interest rates.

Conclusion

Put most simply, increasing interest rates to control inflation makes sense if your starting point is a conventional supply and demand analysis where macroeconomic outcomes can be regulated by demand management. But increasing interest rates to attack inflation makes less sense if your analysis starts by looking at how capital will respond to such an increase, and how that will impact on economic flows in the economy. In this scenario, increasing interest rates is possibly counter-productive (even in its own terms – and not even thinking about the human cost of the “desired” economic slowdown). At best it is a blunt instrument when more direct market interventions (such as price caps or taxes) could better impact on the particularly economic flows driving of inflation.

Or, to put it another way (in light of populist media attacks on Philip Lowe and Michele Bullock), don’t blame the person or personality of the Reserve Bank Governor – blame the economic theory.


[1]              In Shaikh’s analysis, this supply-demand-equilibrium applies as much to Keynesian and neo-Keynesian economics as to neoclassical economics, it is just that the former theories recognise that the equilibrium may, without state stimulus, be below a full employment of resources.

What Level of Unemployment is Acceptable? Theory and Policy

In a previous post I highlighted unemployment data which showed that, despite all the business and economic talk of labour shortages, the rates of effective unemployment are higher than in the official ABS headline data and that there remains a problem of entrenched long-term unemployment. However, in policy terms, what we make of the level of unemployment – and what to do about it – is shaped by one’s theoretical starting point (with the following discussion of theory drawn primarily from my reading of Anwar Shaihk’s Capitalism, Competition, Conflict and Crisis).

Theories of Unemployment

Neoclassical

In the neoclassical theoretical model there should be no unemployment because in a perfect market wages would be at the price where the market cleared – that is, the demand for labour matched its supply. Any unemployment is therefore a product of market imperfections (lack of full market knowledge or mobility of resources, or pesky things like minimum wages, unions, government regulation, or welfare payments). While unemployment obviously exists in the real world, this is a “natural” consequence of the departure from the perfect competition and the setting of wages above the level of market clearance (zero unemployment). Unemployment then becomes “voluntary” – an option chosen by society and by individuals where welfare payments allow people not to work at the market equilibrium rate.

For Friedman and others, this “natural rate of unemployment” morphed into the NAIRU – the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment. In theory, once you approach full-employment, there is increasing competition for labour and the price of labour increases, which drives inflation. But with a certain level of voluntary unemployment, that inflation tendency kicks in below the level below full employment – hence, the effective rate of full employment (or the desired level of unemployment) is the point just before employment “accelerates inflation”.

The graph below shows the Australian Treasury estimates of the rate of NAIRU over the last 40 years, with the pre-pandemic estimate just under 5%. While there are endless arguments about the estimates and the theoretical relationships underlying it, the NAIRU and the need to contain inflation has long been a part of the dominant rationale for maintaining some level of unemployment.

Line graph showing the estimated NAIRU declining from around 7% in 1980 to just under 5% in 2019, and the much more volatile official unemployment rate above the NAIRU in the 1980s, and again in the 1990s, falling to below the NAIRU in the early 2000s then rising after the Global Financial Crisis.

Keynesian

By contrast, those coming from Keynesian and post-Keynesian traditions assume an imperfect market and have a theory that demand drives supply and economic growth. Given that the imperfect market will be below full employment, the government can (and should) via stimulus spending boost aggregate demand up to the point of full employment. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) fits within this tradition, but adds a jobs guarantee as an additional “automatic” stabiliser (see for instance, Kelton, pg 65-66).

In this context, the persistence of unemployment simply shows that neoliberal governments worried about inflation have not provided enough stimulus to reach the levels of full employment.

Classical

Like many classical (and neoclassical) political economists, Anwar Shaikh believes that such Keynesian stimulus measures can lead to short-term economic boosts, but in the longer term unemployment will return as a natural part of capitalist competition. Marx referred to this as the “reserve army of the unemployed”, but it is not a conspiratorial “disciplining of labour”. Rather, in Shaikh’s view ongoing unemployment is a function of the logical response of profit-driven capital to full employment.

Supply and demand processes suggest that as unemployment falls, there is upward pressure on wages. This negatively impacts on profit rate, which in turn, leads to lower investment which decreases the demand for labour. Alternatively, capital can look to counter this increasing cost pressure by increasing labour supply (by migration or capital flight to source labour overseas), and this increased labour supply will lead to unemployment. Or, in response to rising wages, capital can invest to increase productivity, which displaces labour and creates unemployment. There is no pre-determined path, but ultimately capitalist production is driven by profit not demand, and the self-governing mechanisms of profit-seeking ensure some level of unemployment.

Implications of the Different Theories

There are of course lots of variations within the three broad approaches described above, and I am not going to adjudicate these long-standing theoretical differences here. However, it is interesting to look at the implications of the recent employment data (in my previous post) for different aspects of these theories.

The existence of the sustained and significant unemployment highlighted in my previous post is obviously not consistent with the neoclassical paradigm of a perfect market, but it is compatible with the revised Friedmanite version where less than actual full employment is functionally full employment. Since many of those in long-term unemployment are never going to get jobs (as new labour market entrants out-compete them), the relevant inflationary impact will be at some level of unemployment below 0%.

That said, it is not immediately clear how the official unemployment rate relates to the NAIRU and inflationary pressures if, as we saw in my previous post, 72% of the newly-employed do not come from those who are counted as unemployed. The unemployment rate is simply not measuring the potential labour supply which is purportedly driving wages and prices.

The persistent unemployment data is also consistent with Marx’s notion of a reserve army of the unemployed, but again, the data suggests that most of this reserve army is located outside of the ranks of the unemployed. Shaikh’s analysis of capital’s response to near full-employment may be valid, but it relates more to a labour supply not-in-the-labour-force than to the long-term unemployed, who are more an outside sub-class than part of the reserve army.

But perhaps the biggest challenges of persistent long-term unemployment are posed for post-Keynesian theory and the attempts at government intervention to ensure full employment. At the macroeconomic level, having a cohort of semi-permanently excluded job seekers points to the limits of generic demand-led stimulus strategies. It is not just that there has not been enough stimulus. The barriers faced by many unemployed people may prevent them from winning most of the newly-created jobs (as jobs are filled from outside the labour force). More demand management will not (or not easily) create full employment.

A Job Guarantee

This leads many, particularly in MMT, to argue for more direct government job creation through a job guarantee (with the government or government-funded organisations “employers of last resort”). In theory, this should be good for those entrenched in long-term unemployment. Direct job creation can target disadvantaged groups, and there would be a guarantee of a job that they would probably not get in a competitive market. However, here we are not necessarily talking about people who freely move in and out of jobs as the labour market changes. The jobs need to be created and supported in a way to address the specific needs of those with barriers to employment – which is a difficult and resource intensive task.

This is recognised at least in passing by some proponents of a job guarantee, but much of their description of how such a program might work seems to suggest a workforce moving flexibly in and out of the guarantee program. Moreover, even if people with employment barriers flock to a job guarantee, if sufficient numbers of them can’t go back to the private workforce when demand for labour increases, then the macroeconomic “automatic stabiliser” can’t do its job in adjusting labour supply.

These problems may or may not be solvable, but they do mean that the Keynesian-inspired solutions are not as easy as they are often portrayed.

Other Possibilities

There are of course dangers in focusing on labour “supply-side” issues like the barriers faced by long-term unemployed people. This can and has led to reactionary “victim-blaming” policies, and to surveillance and back-to-work programs which pretend that the problem is a deficit in the unemployed person rather than the labour market.

However, if we take the persistence of long-term unemployment as evidence of systemic unemployment within capitalism, as per the classical (and even the neoclassical) theories, then perhaps we can stop demonising and starving those who are unemployed. We might accept that the labour market can’t provide income for everyone, and actually build support and value them outside the labour market.

This could be an argument for a Universal Basic Income, but it could also simply be an argument for the removal at some point of “job seeking” pretences of current social security payments. This already happens (in a minimum and controlled way) for people over 55 where mutual obligation requirements change after 12 months to basically accept volunteer work instead of employment. But the payment is still called “JobSeeker” rather than, say, a Community Participation Allowance, and in practice it may be closer to a job guarantee than a UBI.

Whatever, any income support (universal or not) needs to be at a level which provides for a minimum healthy standard of living – which clearly is not the case currently. This need to increase payments is not just for humanitarian reasons, but a recognition that the unemployed are the collateral damage of capitalist production (the classical theory) or that they are bearing the cost on behalf of the community of fighting inflation (the neoclassical model).

The acceptance of the inevitability of some level of unemployment may not initially sit well with those interested in equality and the rights of those who are struggling, but it can still have progressive possibilities. And it may be better than simply hoping for a full employment which may not be possible.

Of course, if full employment is possible, accepting less is selling out. That is why the theory matters!